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Eric Hobsbawm relates how at the end of one of his lectures a student 
approached him with the question: ‘Professor, do I understand from the 
expression Second World War that there was a First World War?’. The 
anecdote illustrated the historian’s fear that knowledge of history was becoming 
desperately truncated and shallow. The centennial of the Great War makes such 
a query unlikely   today. However any reader could be forgiven for asking 
whether the expression the ‘second slavery’ implies that that there was a ‘first 
slavery’, and if so what is the distinction? 
The term ‘second slavery’ has been adopted by historians of the slave regimes 
which flourished in the Americas in the 19th century, above all in the US South, 
Brazil and Cuba  in the years 1800-1860, and which met their nemesis shortly 
thereafter (1865-1888).1 The term ‘second slavery’ foregrounds  the fact that 
slavery in the Americas did not wither and die in the post-colonial period. 
Another way of putting the point would be to say that industrialisation and the 
advent of modernity did not automatically spell the death of slavery but rather 
intensified and spread it. The result was a new American slavery which 
reworked and reorganised the institution.  
 The ‘first slavery’, in this view, was seen in the New World  in the period  1520 
to 1800. It was linked to the colonial systems of slavery elaborated by Spain, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain and France, and which were eventually 
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shaken and wound up by a wave of insurrection and abolition between 1791 and 
1848. In some cases empire was defeated but not slavery, in others slavery  was 
suppressed but not empire. 
The first slavery was colonial in character, with its legal and socio-economic 
underpinnings deriving from the Old World. especially the Mediterranean. 
Though it took time, the first slavery involved two novel institutions, an oceanic  
slave trade and the American slave plantation. Prototypes developed on the 
Atlantic islands and then imitated in Brazil and the wider Caribbean. The sugar 
plantations of Barbados and the tobacco plantations of Virginia became major 
suppliers. Never before in history had there been sea-borne empire like this, 
acquiring forced labourers in one continent, assembling and exploiting them in 
another, in order to produce  items of  popular consumption in a third.  
The slave systems that arose in the New World owed much to the example of 
slavery in Ancient Greece and Rome. Slavery  in the Americas adopted crucial 
features of Roman law. Thus in the case of slavery the condition of the child 
followed that if its mother, whereas other social identities followed the father. 
Roman slavery was distinguished by a strong sense of private ownership and 
property. It was ‘chattel slavery’ and so was the slavery of the New World. The 
prestige of the Ancient world, and the fact that Christian teaching took slavery 
for granted, gave the institution legitimacy. However there were important 
differences. 2  
In the Ancient world slavery was concentrated in the metropolis while with the 
New World’s ‘first slavery’ the slaves were concentrated in overseas colonies 
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and there were few or no slaves in the metropolis. The planters of the ‘second 
slavery’ did not accept this colonial status, throwing it off in the case of the 
United States and Brazil, aspiring to autonomy or independence in the case of 
Cuba.  
Both the first and the second slavery in the Americas became a far more 
thoroughly commercialised than was the case for Ancient slavery.  In the 
Ancient world many of the slaves brought to Rome, or working Roman estates, 
had been captured by Roman commanders. The European  traders of the early 
modern and modern period purchased slaves from African merchants and rulers. 
The New World planters themselves bought many other inputs from colonial 
merchants and aimed to sell tropical and sub-tropical slave produce  in 
European markets. In the colonial epoch the ‘first slavery’ was organised into  
mercantile monopolies, such that English or French or Portuguese colonists 
were obliged to sell their produce only to national carriers. The European 
colonists sometimes began as free lance settlers who did not welcome colonial 
control but they found themselves obliged to accept metropolitan authority 
because the colonial powers controlled the sea-lanes and harbours. 
These colonial systems were belligerent and rivalrous, with a stormy sequence 
of wars as well as an undertow of commercial competition. Compared to the 
slavery of the Ancient world, that of the Americas was less diverse, more 
concentrated in menial employment and more racialized, fastening its shackles 
on black Africans and those of African descent. The ‘first slavery’ developed in 
a late feudal, early modern world where capitalism was in its infancy. The 
‘second slavery’ was caught up in a process of large scale industrialisation and 
extended ‘primitive accumulation’. The spread of capitalist social relations in 
the 16th and 17th centuries put money in new hands and encouraged increasingly 
market dependant forms of existence. Many grew to expect their basic needs to 
be met by the money they earned rather than their own produce. 
	  
The ‘first slavery’ in the Americas was extraordinarily successful but highly 
lop-sided and ultimately self-destructive. In the most successful colonies the 
enslaved came to outnumber the free by ten to one. Around 1770 slave produce 
dominated Atlantic commerce and had created great fortunes in Bordeaux and 
Liverpool, London and New York, Boston and Nantes. Financial institutions 
made great use of ‘letters of credit’  drawn on the  plantation suppliers.  
Colonial slave systems were plagued by conflict and instability, as planters, 
merchants and colonial officials  quarrelled over the division of the spoils and 
as the different colonial powers disputed control of territory, rivers and sea-
lanes. Financial speculation and crisis bred insecurity. Colonies like French 
Saint Domingue and British Jamaica where, the free people of colour came to 
outnumber the whites, proved especially vulnerable.  In the century and a half 
prior to 1776 conflict over American territory and slave produce fuelled 
imperial conflict. The outbreak of the War for American Independence (1776-
83) challenged imperial power, struck a blow for free trade, and injected an 
ideological appeal into a struggle that was no longer simply about territory and 
dynastic aggrandisement. This trend was accentuated by the French Revolution, 
the Anglo-French wars (1792-1815), the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) and 
the wars for independence in Latin America (1810-24). The great commanders 
and statesmen now had to reckon with the challenge of slave revolt, abolitionist 
movements  and projects of emancipation. 
There is more to be said about the rise and fall of the ‘first slavery’, topics I 
have addressed in other work ( The Making of New World Slavery, 1492-1800  
and  The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848). Here I focus on the 
question ‘why the second slavery?’ as a prelude to addressing how it worked 
and why it was eventually defeated. 
The New World’s ‘second slavery’ dates from around 1790, reached its high 
point at mid-century and had been entirely suppressed by 1888, when Brazil 
	  
enacted the last emancipation. Even historians who do not use the concept have 
registered that the growth of plantation slavery in the United States, Cuba and 
Brazil in the period 1820 to 1860  represents a significant clustering and 
displays certain important common features, as well as some interesting 
contrasts.3 
The ‘second slavery’ represented a more autonomous,  more durable and, in 
market terms, more ‘productive’ slave regime, capable of withstanding the 
onslaught of the Age of Revolution and of meeting the rising demand for 
plantation produce. Colonial slavery had from the beginning been linked to  the 
expansion of markets associated with the rise of capitalism in Northwestern 
Europe. By the early decades of the 19th century the Industrial Revolution was 
vastly expanding demand and supplying crucial inputs to the plantation and to 
the trade in plantation produce. The ‘second slavery’ was largely ‘post 
colonial’, with the planters enjoying  a more direct relationship to power. This 
new American slavery flourished as mercantilism was dismantled and  as the 
age of steam revolutionised transportation and processing.  
Some critiques of colonial slavery argued that it was only commercially viable 
thanks to mercantilist protection. Eric Williams, the Trinidadian historian and 
national leader, argued this case in his widely influential book Capitalism and 
Slavery, first published in 1944. But this claim was too narrowly focussed. The 
British West Indian planters did flourish thanks to the ‘sugar duties’ which gave 
them privileged access to the British market. But the dismantling of 
mercantilism in the aftermath of the American Revolution, and other Atlantic 
revolutions, brought ruin to some planters but offered encouragement and 
widening outlets to many more. British and French planters, once the richest in 
the hemisphere, saw themselves demoted and marginalised. But when trade 
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restrictions were lifted, cotton planters in the US, sugar planters in Cuba and 
coffee planters in Brazil all flourished.  
The ‘second slavery’ should not be too sharply set apart from the ‘first slavery’ 
since there were major themes of continuity. While some features of the first 
(colonial) slavery had exhausted their usefulness, or had been shown to be 
dangerous, many of the core features of plantation slavery remained and were 
adapted to new conditions and new technologies. At this point I will only briefly 
note these processes since explaining them is the task of the chapters which 
follow. However some preliminary points will indicate a direction of travel and 
a knot of problems needing clarification.  
Those who have advanced the concept of the ‘second slavery’ see it as a 
mutation of  the ‘first’.  Both types of slavery consigned a racially-defined sub-
group of captives to forced labour on premium staples. Both organized slaves in 
gangs, or via a ‘task’ system. The plantation labour force was itself valued as a 
commodity. In both regimes the slaves were chattels who could be bought and 
sold, without regard to family ties. Yet both rested on so-called ‘natural 
economy’. Both encouraged the slaves to meet their own food needs by 
cultivating maize, tending chickens and by working garden plots in their scant 
few hours of ‘free time’. The precarious slave family or community would try to 
assert rights of possession over domestic animals, or provision grounds, or 
burial grounds, and overseers might sometimes concede these rights. The 
slaveowners as a body reserved the right to sell off slaves whenever necessary 
or convenient. The so-called ‘natural economy’ was thus a site of class struggle, 
though one in which, in ‘normal’ times, the dice were loaded in favour of the 
master class, because of the latter’s access to resources and control of organized 
force (on which more in the next two chapters). The planters could also use 
slaves on construction, or in tasks demanding great skill, at little or no extra 
	  
cost. Clearly all these aspects of the slave regimes were not minor features and 
suggest strong continuity. 
.But the ‘second slavery’ certainly had original features too. The ‘second 
slavery’ was a species of de-colonized slavery, one that claimed sovereignty and 
aspired to stand on its own two feet. Planters played a leading role in the 
independence struggle in North America, especially if we recognise that this 
struggle had a protracted character, and that it was not fully accomplished in 
1783, or 1787, or 1815, but was still reaching for new boundaries and new 
content in the 1820s and beyond. The Empire of Brazil was formally declared in 
1822 but there was a prior experience of autonomy from Portugal and, as we 
will see, many subsequent efforts to attain real independence. Cuba never 
ceased to be a Spanish colony but its leading men reshaped the colonial pact, 
manipulated metropolitan politics and advanced the independent  interests of the 
sacarocracia, or sugar lords.  
The ‘second slavery’ supplied the broad markets reached by ‘free trade’ and 
comercio libre, by industrialisation and the ‘market revolution’. With the old 
mercantilism swept away there was no room for manufacturing bans or 
monopolies but some tariffs remained and the state regulated the market in land. 
The ‘second slavery’ needed a supportive and friendly state but was not state 
supervised. It was strongly focussed on plantations and farms, and the 
plantations had a more industrial character. The ‘second’ slavery’ was in some 
respects more ‘modern’ – and more ‘productive’, if we only consult marketed 
output - but certainly not ‘better’ or more humane. The ‘second slavery’ was 
linked to the ‘speed up’ of industrial capitalism and, as it expanded, the number 
of gruelling tasks to be performed multiplied. This new American slavery  had 
an even more intensely racial character than its colonial predecessor. This 
particularly concerned the status of free people of colour. In the last years of 
colonial slavery in the French and British islands their numbers increased and 
	  
their status improved, albeit not without conflict. With the advent of a more 
rigorous plantation regime, with strong demand for plantation ‘hands’, and with 
the fears aroused by the ‘age of revolution’, manumission became more difficult 
and there was a deterioration in the condition of the free coloured. The main 
territories of the ‘second slavery’ had natural advantages when it came to 
cultivating the key commodities – sugar in Cuba, cotton in the US South and 
coffee in Brazil. The systems of colonial slavery had lacked the land needed to 
expand output. The planters  had offset this constraint by introducing  fertilisers, 
new crop varieties and irrigation systems (notably in Saint Domingue and 
British Guyana), but nothing that could  compare with the huge spaces which 
were to be seized by the planters of the ‘second slavery’. The latter developed a 
strong competitive edge but their expansion was also the result of physical, 
military, encroachment and conquest, at the expense of other states and of the 
indigenous peoples. In chapter three I will argue that slave plantations did not 
impose monoculture but certainly the growth of the principal commodities in 
the epoch of the ‘second slavery’ was imperative and aggressive enough to  earn 
them  royal or noble titles, ‘King Cotton’, ‘Su Majestad el Azucar’, and Baron 
Coffee.  
That planters exercised political power in the regime of the ‘second slavery’ is 
not to say that they monopolised such power. Each of these territories was part 
of a larger political entity, respectively part of the North American Republic,  
part of the Brazilian Empire, and a formal colony of Spain. (I will be arguing 
that Cuba was a very unusual type of colony, unlike any seen in the prior history 
of the Americas). In all cases the planters, and the merchants and bankers linked 
to them, enjoyed privileged access to power but also needed social and political 
allies, both in the plantation zone and outside it..  
The foundational event of the ‘second slavery’ was the American Revolution, 
yet it took several decades for plantation growth to be established in major new 
	  
territories. In a wave of upheavals from 1776 to 1825 the New World planters, 
and the merchants linked to them, were often crucial protagonists, whether as 
revolutionaries or as counter revolutionaries. Their’s was a difficult feat, 
catching the tide of change while not being inundated by it. 
For many reasons the planters of the US South played a crucial role in the rise 
of the ‘second slavery’ – and in its downfall too. Around 1800 there were more 
slaves in Brazil than in the United States, but the Portuguese colony was 
smothered by a peculiarly elaborate mercantilist system. By 1820 there were 1.5 
million slaves in the United States, 1.1 million in Brazil and perhaps 350,000 in 
Cuba. By 1860 there were 3.5 million slaves in the US South, 1.0 million in 
Brazil and 400,000 in Cuba. The planters of the US South were able to count on 
the steady growth of the slave population, while the Cuban and Brazilian 
planters struggled to expand the size of slave crews by recourse to the slave 
traffic (contrasts to be explored in chapter 4 below). In this later year there were 
some 40,000 planters in the US South, about 10,000 in Brazil and 2,000 in 
Cuba. These estimates are rough and ready, and do not properly account for the  
different role and character of slaveholders in the three societies. While they 
begin to indicate  the differential power of the planter class in the three areas the 
discrepancy was even greater than they imply, because of the respective 
maturity of their plantation systems and their respective level of economic 
integration. Thus the US South had 15,000 miles of railroad in 1860, Cuba 800 
miles and Brazil 600 miles. The ‘white’ population of the US South in 1860 was 
around 7 million, with many smaller slaveholders aspiring to became planters. 
In Cuba the white population comprised almost a half of the total while in 
Brazil whites were only a quarter of the total and were outnumbered by the free 
people of colour. 
In both colonial and post colonial systems of slavery the plantation was in many 
ways an island, standing apart as a social isolate. Slaves were forbidden to 
	  
travel outside it unless they had a pass signed by the overseer. Slaves were 
formally barred from learning to read or write. Such rules might not always be 
enforced but the spirit they breathed was still telling. The literacy of whites in 
the US South was significantly below that of whites in the North, but still 
amounted to around two thirds of the whole. Literacy in Cuba and Brazil lagged 
far behind that of the US South.  
 Re-making New World  Slavery 
By the early nineteenth century the dangers and drawbacks of owning slaves had 
become rather obvious. Slaves often hated their masters even when they feigned 
love for them. They would steal from their owners and conspire against them. 
Given the opportunity they would run away or join a revolt. Of course there were 
paternalist masters and grateful slaves, but intense ambivalence even then. The 
planters of the Americas were often protagonists of the Age of Revolution and 
knew both that ending colonial rule transformed their  prospects for commercial 
and territorial expansion, and that it obliged them to take full responsibility for 
keeping their slaves in subjection, despite new opportunities for  resistance and 
escape. The numbers of slaves who escaped thanks to the Seven Years War 
(1756-63) was probably not more than a few hundred at most. The Spanish 
monarch offered freedom to escaping slaves belonging to British owners but the 
journey down to St Augustine was long and exposed. In contrast  at least thirty or 
forty thousand slaves escaped or gained manumission during the course of the 
War of Independence. We will explore below how this came to pass but the great 
majority sought the British lines, while about a tenth of the total joined up with the 
rebel forces, mainly serving as substitutes in the militia of Northern states.  
The challenge to slavery  was political or philosophical not simply a consequence 
of heightened security fears in time of war. The ideological threat to slavery came 
together in  the 1760s with the first anti-slavery writings and legal challenges. 
	  
In an Atlantic world beset by revolution the questioning of slavery was at first 
overshadowed by the great issue of popular sovereignty and its proper scope and 
consequences. Neither the American Declaration of Independence, nor the   
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, nor the US Constitution 
and Bill of Rights, addressed the plight of the two to three million enslaved 
persons in the Americas. But the Pennsylvania assembly did approve a moderate 
emancipation law in 1780  after public debate, and in 1787 the British Society for 
the Abolition of the Atlantic slave trade had begun to mobilize public opinion on a 
large scale, with mass petitions and well-attended meetings and a flood of 
pamphlets and newspaper articles. This first abolitionist movement attracted 
support from parliamentarians but its momentum was broken in 1792 by an Anti-
Jacobin panic. The Revolutionary terror in France and a huge slave revolt in Saint 
Domingue, the New World’s richest colony, persuaded the parliamentary 
abolitionists that the time was not ripe to press their case. English radicals had to 
fight for their own survival as they became the target of ‘Crown and Anchor’ 
mobs (named for a tavern the mob frequented). Edmund Burke’s  Reflections 
attacked the French Revolution for fostering servile savagery and actual 
cannibalism.  
The 19th century planters sponsored new political formulae, negotiated new social 
alliances and inherited, adapted and reconfigured a ‘racial contract’ that would  
attract the support of the substantial bodies of non-slaveholding free persons to be 
found in these societies. Doctrines related to race, property and national interest  
were advanced to justify slaveholding and block abolitionist challenges. Like the 
old stereotypes the new racial concepts and stereotypes  portrayed  those of 
African descent as requiring  physical compulsion and harsh restraint, and Indians 
as worthy only of contempt. . Presenting the resort to mass enslavement as the 
destiny of a new nation was a demanding proposition and different from trying to 
justify slavery in a distant colony. It led some to challenge class exclusion among 
	  
whites, giving rise to the racialized democracy of the white man’s republic. .4 
Slaveholding both stimulated and warped  the planter’s vision of the good society 
and the national future. In the United States it led to the celebration of a white 
man’s civilization explicitly resting on an underclass of black toilers.  
The  Cuban and Brazilian planters shrank from republicanism and moved 
cautiously towards greater autonomy but many began to call themselves 
‘Liberals’, a term first applied to politics around the time of the Cortes of Cádiz in 
1810.  Some of these Liberals owned slaves themselves, and nearly all of them 
functioned in  a political order which upheld slavery. Like North American Whigs 
they accepted a degree of racial exclusion but were uncomfortable with both 
slavery and democracy. They worked for a ‘civilizing’ and ‘whitening’ of the 
underlying population, a reduction in reliance on slaves, and a denial of active 
political rights to those without property. The worldviews of US Senator Henry 
Clay, José Bonifácio, the Brazilian statesman, Thomas Babington Macaulay, the 
British historian,  Alexis de Tocqueville, the French historian, and José Antonio 
Saco, the Cuban historian, were not identical but they shared much in common, 
including their respect for a supposed European or North American civilizing 
mission, their acceptance of Atlantic political economy and their rejection of 
radical anti-slavery. While the radical racists embraced the ‘second slavery’ 
wholeheartedly, the liberals found its dynamism disturbing. 
While slavery was undoubtedly a traditional institution, the ‘second slavery’, or 
new American slavery,  represented an innovation, a fresh start, with new friends 
and new enemies, a new socio-political context, and new technologies. The main 
centres of growth in the period 1800-1830 were regions that had not previously 
been much involved in plantation development.  The Mississippi Valley, the 
hinterland of Matanzas, or the interior of Sao Paulo offered vast new spaces for 
plantation agriculture but required the introduction of tens of thousands  of  
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labourers to clear the forest, build the roads and cultivate the staples. The 
indigenous peoples were deemed unsuitable, and anyway refused to be 
conscripted to these tasks. A number of planter statesmen –mainly those of a 
Liberal persuasion - urged the introduction of free immigrants from Europe but 
later experience was to show that any such scheme would require state initiative 
and cash on a massive scale. The planters of the Americas distrusted the state and 
were allergic to taxation. Eventually, in the mid 1880s, the state of Sao Paulo  
recruited hundreds of thousands of  Italian migrants to work on the coffee estates. 
The planters had to concede a new status to the labourer and to dig deep into their 
pockets to pay for mass re-settlement. The experiment worked, though the 
planters still resented emancipation when it came in 1888.. 
In the early 19th century the planters of the Americas found it easier to buy slaves 
and mobilize them to the new regions. Innovators in many ways they chose not to 
innovate when it came to recruiting a labour force but instead to adopt and adapt 
the slave regime inherited from the colonial era. Because the demands made on 
that regime by the plantation were ever more persistent the slave condition was 
itself more tightly focused and more intensely racialized. 
In contrast to the often absentee proprietors of the English and French Caribbean 
the planters of the US South, Brazil and Cuba were mostly resident on their 
estates, or in nearby towns. They lived in proximity to their slaves and could take 
personal responsibility for their estates. Their political leverage was very 
considerable. They were not just a ‘lobby’ but rather  part and parcel of the ruling 
order. In the smaller Caribbean islands slaves comprised 80 to 90 per cent of the 
population,  rendering these colonies particularly vulnerable to unrest. In the US 
South, Cuba and Brazil the enslaved were usually outnumbered by free persons 
who comprised never less than 44 per cent of the total. In Cuba and Brazil there 
were a growing number of free people of colour but few of these identified with 
the still enslaved and some actually owned slaves themselves.  Great fortunes 
	  
were made in the Caribbean island colonies but plantation wealth was still only a 
fraction of total national wealth – around 5-6 per cent -  reducing planter influence 
and making it easier to compensate them. The value of slaves loomed much larger 
in the United States and Brazil (where it comprised half of national wealth) and in 
Cuba too. 
The cycle of wars and revolutions put American slave-owners on their mettle, as 
they mobilized old and new sources of social power. The revolutionary planters of 
the United States had taken a bold initiative at a time when anti-slavery was only a 
speck on the horizon. The hacendados of Cuba and fazendieros of Brazil were far  
more cautious, but by no means passive, as we shall see. 
The large land-owners of Spanish South and Central  America proved quite 
conservative during the liberation  struggle, slow to move against Spain and 
hostile to radical democratic themes. But in the later stages of the struggle, and 
under the influence of Simon Bolivar, Vicente Guerrero and some other more 
radical leaders, the Liberators  enrolled many black soldiers and gone beyond 
slave trade bans to endorse ‘Free Womb’ Laws (i.e. laws that freed future children 
born to slave mothers). In some of the new republics slavery was abolished 
outright  in the 1820s (Chile and Mexico) while in others it lingered until the 
1850s. These measures were very uneven and did little for racial equality despite 
the outstanding black contribution to Spain’s defeat. But they did prevent the 
growth of a slave system in the new republics.5 In this regard they may be 
compared to the anti-slavery measures that eventually wound down slavery in the 
Northern US states, especially those like New York (1799) and New Jersey (1804) 
where Free Womb laws phased out a slavery that  had once been a significant 
presence. A few Southern planters yearned for such a solution but they became 
increasingly isolated. The overwhelming majority of planters clung on to their 
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human chattels and the claim that they were reluctant slaveholders grew 
increasingly threadbare.   
The  slave-owners  of  the American South, Brazil and Cuba were not deterred by 
slave bitterness or ‘ingratitude’, nor by the scorn of many free persons outside the 
slave zone. Even those  public-spirited planters who admitted that the presence of 
slaves compromised the task of nation-building remained attached to slave-
owning and contented themselves with token gestures and measures which did not 
actually reduce overall slave numbers. A US Colonization Society was established 
in 1816 to encourage slave manumission and resettlement, but it was a sham and 
never managed to ship more than a few thousand former slaves to Africa. 
Meanwhile the US slave population, numbered in millions, rose steadily despite 
the end of slave imports.  
The Persistence of Slavery  
Why did planters in the new regions remain or become slave-owners? In the case 
of some Eastern seaboard planters inertia, and the pleasure of lording it over their 
servants and neighbours, no doubt played a part. In later decades last ditch support 
for racial slavery morphed into the defence of a new regime of white supremacy, 
cherished by poor and middling whites as well as by planters. But in the 
construction of the ‘second slavery’ the planters’ main motive was to make 
money, since by doing so they could pay off their debts, raise the value of their 
estates and secure their position in the master class. Making money required  
selecting the right crop, practicing good husbandry, an effective disposition of the 
labour force, and being skilful or lucky in deciding when to sell. Factors and 
merchants would help the planters, charging commission’ 
In the United States convention assigned the term ‘planter’ to those with more 
than twenty slaves. In Cuba the owner of a sugar estate would own many more, in 
Brazil the proprietor of a coffee estate somewhat less. But in all three regions the 
	  
average slaveholding was just 6 slaves, a figure much reduced by the fact that 
there were many who owned just one or two slaves. In each of these regions the 
young man with a parcel of slaves – whether half a dozen or twenty – would 
aspire to become a planter and would see his slaveholding as the stepping stone to 
wealth and status. Those constructing  new plantations would usually bring some 
personal or family wealth and connections to the project in addition to a parcel of 
slaves. Even so they would  require credit, as any plantation would take a few 
years to produce its first serious crop. In the meantime there were many expenses 
to meet (equipment, provisions, building materials, extra slaves, etc).  
It was critical that there were merchants, store-keepers, factors and bankers 
willing to extend credit to planters. In fact the expense of bringing new lands into 
production as plantations was so considerable that in many cases it would not 
have happened unless such backers could be found. The willingness and ability of 
commercial backers to extend credit was, in its turn, an expression of their 
eagerness to obtain the premium staples and to participate in plantation profits.  
From one point of view the slavery surge was a reflection of the consumer’s 
willingness to lay out their often hard-earned cash on plantation produce. On the 
other it represented the slaveowner’s wish to make good use of his asset. If he 
wished he could, for a while, subsist as a self-sufficient patriarch, living off slave 
produce and occasionally selling some of his slaves. But most aspired to more 
than this. Slaves were a form of capital, indeed a very tangible and mobile form of 
capital, leading most owners of a slave crew to wish to realize a return from them, 
with planting being, in the circumstances, the most promising bet. The logic of 
slaveholding capitalism offered encouragement to business-like behavior, but also 
some reassurance. Like any agricultural concern the plantation would have to 
contend with bad weather, plant diseases, pests, price swings and so forth. But 
from the investor or creditor’s point of view there was always the reassuring 
thought that, in the event of difficulty, the value of the plantation, and its slave 
	  
crew, stood as the explicit or implicit collateral. Planters sometimes passed laws to 
protect their assets from seizure but they needed commercial backers and could 
not defy them for long.6 However there were disasters that could not be hedged by 
means of slave collateral – epidemics and slave revolts, both of which destroyed 
capital value. The availability of insurance could reduce some of these risks, 
lending some resilience to the plantation enterprise at a price (and  excluding slave 
revolt, a risk insurers declined). 
The foregoing analysis of the new slavery suggests an interesting conclusion. The 
mercantile and banking elite of London and Paris, New York and Boston, New 
Orleans and Rio de Janeiro, Madrid and Havana  bear a specific responsibility for 
the slavery surge. They could have offered credit only to intending yeoman 
farmers, who could have used family labour to cultivate cotton, coffee and sugar. 
They could have further backed the provision of processing facilities. But they did 
none of these things because slave-less farms were not a good credit prospect – 
they lacked ‘collateral’. Slaveholding planters, on the other hand, had liquid assets 
at their disposal.  
The personal wealth of the planters and the generally buoyant price of slaves 
makes it strange that there was ever any doubt about the profitability of slave-
owning . The explanation, no doubt, is that the planters found themselves pitted in 
competition against one another, some in declining sectors, or working exhausted 
or marginal land. The great majority of planters had to borrow money to prepare 
the harvest and to offer part of the future crop as collateral. These arrangements 
still allowed planters to prosper in normal times, but the less successful found 
themselves deeper in debt and might be forced to sell some of their slaves.        
That slave plantations in the Americas could be, and typically were, profitable is 
no longer in doubt. The detailed evidence will be scrutinized in the next two 
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chapters. But here we note the seeming paradox of profitable plantations and 
indebted planters. The beneficiary of the toil of the slaves could be, and often was, 
those who supplied the planter with credit. There was also the waxing and waning 
of  rival regions and crops. It took several decades before it became clear that 
Cuban conditions were more favourable to sugar and Brazilian conditions more 
favourable to coffee. During this time there were losers as well as winners in the 
planter class, with Cuban coffee estates closing, and selling their slaves to the 
sugar sector, while in Brazil sugar producers  were eventually forced to yield to 
the more rapid advance of coffee, often selling their slaves to their coffee-
producing rivals. It will be necessary below to scrutinize these contrasting paths 
more closely. But the overall conclusion is that slave-worked cotton, sugar and 
coffee estates were profitable, and that those who owned slaves were drawn to sell 
them to  the planters who had the best prospect of garnering those profits.7 
Plantation development required large amounts of coordinated labour which 
slaves could supply. It demanded invigilation of the work teams as they grabbed, 
picked or slashed their way across the ripening field. Cotton needs well-watered 
soil but a dry harvesting season; there should be at least 200 frostless days in the 
year, preferably more, and an average temperature of around 25 C in the middle 
months of the year.8 The 'cotton belt'  of the US South unites these conditions and, 
given the appropriate socio-political conditions, was bound to dominate world 
cotton output. New World  producers also enjoyed an advantage over rivals, 
notably India and Indonesia, in that they were closer to European and North 
American markets. Though sugar cane could be grown in Louisiana, which 
became a major producer supplying over a third of the US market, a cold winter 
could damage the crop. Cuba had no less than 365 frost-free days in the year. The 
island also had an extensive central plain, making for ease of cultivation and 
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transport when compared to Brazil with its rocky torrents and coastal  
escarpments. However once rail transport was available Brazil’s hills were no 
problem for coffee planters – they enabled the slave gangs to be easily monitored. 
Slaveholders had the critical resources  needed to exploit the favourable  terrain 
and climate of the US South, Cuba and Brazil.  They had the labour force and 
credit needed to bring new land into production. The use of enslaved persons thus 
enabled the slaveholders to secure ‘natural advantages’. In the 17th and 18th 
centuries small islands and coastal enclaves had offered good prospects to 
mercantilist colonial regimes. But the transportation revolution wrought by 
steamships, canals and railways opened up huge possibilities if only the new land 
could be secured, cleared and defended from rival claimants. The option for slave 
labour furnished a highly effective solution, at least in the short run.  
 
In the aftermath of slavery each of the key regions of the ‘second slavery’ 
remained the global leader, using some mixture of immigrant labour, seasonal 
labour, share-cropping, small production and family labour. Modest wages were 
paid and some expenses met. But in opening up and working new lands,  slave 
labour did offer great gain to the planters enabling them to siphon off some of the 
surplus commanded by a premium product. The working year was longer in these 
regions than in cooler latitudes, and this may have helped planters to bear the 
greater expense of assembling slave labour. As noted above, the 17th and 18th 
colonial regimes had already captured the gains of tightly coordinated labour, 
whether in gangs or in variants of the task system.9 The planters of the ‘second 
slavery’ were able to achieve a more intense rhythm (as we will see in chapter 3).  
The ‘narratives’ written by slaves and former slaves make it quite clear that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  The	  most	  comprehensive	  study	  iof	  the	  links	  between	  the	  first	  and	  the	  second	  slavery	  is	  Rafael	  de	  Bivar	  
Marquese,	  Feitores	  do	  Corpo,	  Missionários	  de	  Mente:	  senhores,	  letrados	  e	  o	  control	  dos	  escravos	  nas	  Americas,	  
1660-­‐1860,	  Sao	  Paulo	  2004.	  
	  
unremitting toil of the plantation was only maintained because of ferocious 
discipline and physical duress. 
In the language of contemporary political economy the rise of Louisiana, the 
Mississippi Valley, Matanzas, the Paraiba Valley and Sao Paulo can be seen as a 
‘spacial fix’ devised by the planters and their financial backers in New York, 
Liverpool, London and Paris. Defeated in the cane fields of the Caribbean they 
outflanked slave resistance by opening up the interior and spreading plantations to 
areas where they had not previously flourished. Steam transport – steamboats and 
rail roads – was an essential to achieving this fix and details of this contribution 
will be given in chapter 4.. 
The economic vicissitudes of 19th century planters will be explained in the third 
chapters.  Here it is appropriate  to develop the portrait already given of the 
‘second slavery’ by stressing that  it was very much defined by the watershed of 
the ‘twin revolution’ that is of the Age of Revolution’, on the one hand, and of the 
Industrial Revolutions on the other.10  Revolutionary political events had the 
capacity to doom some social forms while promoting others. The ‘second slavery’ 
demonstrated  the institution’s  ability to mutate and evolve new forms, securing 
survival and seizing new commercial opportunities in the jaws of revolutionary 
events which could have consumed them whole. More broadly this evolution also 
testified to the onset of globalization, and to the contradictory impulses it 
imparted.    
Globalisation and Slavery 
New World slavery and the trades to which it gave rise emerged as a 
consequence and component of  the ‘first globalization’. This phase of human 
history was inaugurated by the maritime, commercial and colonial exploits of 
the Portuguese and Spanish in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. It involved 
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truly global exchanges, involving precious metals mined in the Americas (gold 
and silver) being exchanged for luxury items of Eastern provenance (spices, silk 
and porcelain), carried aboard European ships. The Iberian monarchs retained 
control by establishing a system of convoys and a string of maritime strong 
points and coastal depots (‘factories’). . The precious metals boosted Spain’s 
military power and covered the cost of administering and defending its vast 
overseas empire. Looked at from the standpoint of Europe as a whole the inflow 
of specie allowed Christendom to pay for imports from the East. Late medieval 
and early modern Europe produced little of interest to Asian consumers but 
American silver and gold furnished acceptable payment and so financed the 
Eastern spice and luxury trades.  
However Portugal’s trade with the East engaged only two or three galleons a 
year in the late 16th century while Spain’s Pacific trade between Mexico and the 
Philippines was carried in a single large vessel. The Spanish fleet that sailed 
between the Peninsula and the Caribbean often comprised a few dozen ships  
but it carried European goods to the Americas and, apart from silver, little 
American produce on the journey back to Europe.  This early globalisation or 
‘archaic-globalisation’ did little or nothing to alter popular consumption 
patterns in Europe and created only a few tiny enclaves in the East.  
The Spanish conquest of the New World had a devastating impact on the 
indigenous peoples, with tens of millions dying as a result of unfamiliar 
diseases, the break-up of their communities and systematic overwork. 
Bartolomé de las Casas, the man whose writings alerted the whole of Europe to 
this disaster, persuaded the Spanish monarch to ban the enslavement of Indians 
in the 1540s. To his own later regret Las Casas  suggested that hardy Africans 
could serve as a substitute. Facing a labour shortage, and wishing to maximize 
colonial revenue, the Spanish authorities licensed Portuguese merchants to bring 
African captives to the New World where they could sell them to colonists. The 
	  
latter paid good money to acquire badly needed servants and labourers. For 
nearly a century slaves were an ancillary labour force in Spanish America, 
working in the household, or in gardens or workshops, or as artisans building 
towns and fortifications. The great bulk of the mining labour force remained 
indigenous, with some being temporary tribute labourers from the Indian 
villages, and others being wage labourers, yanaconas, formerly slaves to the 
Incas who had been freed by the Spanish.  This initial phase of the enslavement 
in the Americas was shaped by Mediterranean patterns of bondage which 
allowed their first African slaves or their descendants a measure of autonomy in 
their work and the opportunity to buy their freedom if they worked hard for 
many decades, earning money as peddlers or artisans.  António Dominguez 
Ortiz points out that the slaves found in Spain in the late medieval period could 
be white or black, and were themselves ‘sumptuary goods’ – signs of wealth or 
items of luxury.11 This captures something of the slave’s status in Spanish 
America too. Such a status did not prevent slaves also being very useful and, 
when leased out or allowed to ply a trade, profitable too.  
By 1650 persons of African birth or descent comprised half the population of 
Havana, Vera Cruz, Mexico City and Lima in Spanish America, and similar or 
greater proportions in Salvador or Recife in Brazil. Half of these people of 
colour were formally free. They might owe their former owner a measure of 
deference but they dominated various trades and had their own religious 
brotherhoods. In 1653 the Portuguese defeated a 30 year long Dutch attempt to 
capture  Brazil by organizing a black military force, the Henriques, an example 
the Spanish authorities were later to follow. The racial regime in these Iberian 
colonies involved an elaborate racial social hierarchy, different in its 
functioning from the highly polarised and permanent regime of mass racial 
enslavement that appeared in the English colonies following the rise of the 
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plantation. The more complex and flexible Iberian pattern of ‘baroque slavery’, 
in the early colonial period bequeathed residues and echoes, even long after the 
plantation revolution, in cities where it had flourished, such as Havana,  
Salvador and New Orleans. 
 Globalisation acquired added depth and scope in the mid-seventeenth century 
and after, propelled by the rise of capitalist social relations in the countryside 
and towns of North Western Europe. This development put money in the purses 
and pockets of wider layers of the population. English tenant farmers needed to 
produce wheat, wool and other commodities for sale so that they could pay rent 
to their landlords .  Their sales income also allowed them to hire wage labourers 
to boost output. As employers they had an incentive to buy labour-saving 
equipment. Their sales income also allowed them to pay lawyers’ fees and 
government taxes. The cash economy embraced necessities as well as luxuries, 
and enabled commoners to smoke a pipe of tobacco or buy sugar to make 
preserves, cakes and sweetened beverages.  Merchants and manufacturers found 
wider markets and sought to control the supply of these exotic products.  They 
found that New World plantations could furnish them with growing quantities 
of  the items their customers craved - tobacco, sugar, coffee, and chocolate. The 
Indian peoples had helped the colonisers to discover, adapt and consume some 
of these items but they shunned the plantations and were deemed to make very 
poor slaves. The English and French merchants introduced indentured servants 
from Europe who bound themselves to work on the plantations for three or four 
years in return for passage to the colonies, and the promise of land once their 
time was up. But unfamiliar diseases, and lack of tropical survival skills, carried 
off many of the young Europeans. The numbers willing to sell themselves into 
plantation bondage  shrank and the planters turned to a more expensive, but also 
more effective, labour source. The Portuguese had long purchased captives on 
the African coast for work in sugar estates in Brazil and the Atlantic islands. By 
	  
the 1650s the Dutch, English and French were doing likewise in the Caribbean, 
but on a larger scale. Once it became clear that Africans were resilient and self-
reliant, and that they could be coerced for gang-labour on the plantations, the 
Dutch, English and French traders broke into the Portuguese monopoly and 
each year brought tens of thousands of enslaved Africans to the Caribbean and 
North America.  
The slave ship and the plantation became the vehicles of a great confinement 
that was to haul millions from Africa so that they could toil in the American 
plantations to produce exotic drugs and treats for sale to Europe’s  new 
consumers. There was a darkening of the plantation labour force as the number 
of  indentured Europeans or captive Indians dropped to tiny proportions. 
By the beginning of the 18th century the plantations of Brazil and Barbados, 
Jamaica and Martinique, Virginia and Saint Domingue,  were staffed by 
hundreds of thousands of captives purchased on the African coast. Around the 
year 1714 there were three hundred thousand such slaves, and their descendants,  
toiling on the new plantations. With rising demand for tied labour the colour 
coding of the enslavement of ‘negro(e)s’ was more insistent and permanent than 
ever before.  By 1770 the enslaved black population of the Americas had grown 
to 2,300,000. A small number of highly paid free workers were engaged on the 
larger plantations as drivers, book-keepers or doctors but planters were 
producing a premium crop and wished at all costs to avoid a labour force that 
could threaten to withdraw labour at a critical point in the harvest.  
The new consumption patterns required many thousands of ships, not the 
handful engaged in the Eastern trades. Mass demand was matched by mass 
production and permanent regimes of racial enslavement. Atlantic commerce 
became ever more massive, carrying as many as a hundred thousand or more 
	  
captives from  Africa each year and competing with, or complementing, the 
productions of  other continents.  
From the Invention of Breakfast to the Success  of Cotton Underwear 
The consumption of the exotic new commodities was intimate and pervasive, 
drawing those who smoked or chewed tobacco, or drank sweetened tea or 
coffee into a new sub-culture and into dependence on the market. Jan de Vries 
cites the ‘invention of breakfast’, with its sweetened coffee or tea, and its links 
to a new economy of time-keeping, as a new ‘package’ that reorganised 
household consumption and gave European merchants a competitive edge. 
Christopher Bayly picks up the concept and relates it to international commerce: 
‘some of the key consumables in the industrious revolutions of Europe and the 
Americas were tropical products: tobacco, coffee, sugar and tea. The corollary 
of this is that Europeans and their colonists were the greatest beneficiaries of the 
new [global] networks. Chinese, Arab and African  merchants certainly 
prospered yet by far the greatest “value added” was grabbed by Europeans’12.  
In registering this interconnection care must be taken not to confuse the 
‘industriousness’ of the European household with the harsh toil of the 
plantations, as Bayly sometimes does. The two were linked without being the 
same, as Bayly seems to suggest when he writes: ‘The slave system of the 
Caribbean represented the ultimate, forced, industrious revolution’.13 The global 
leverage enjoyed by European traders reflected both their maritime supremacy 
and their access to plantation produce. The forced labour of the slave 
plantations of the Americas yielded a flood of produce that did indeed 
complement the time economy of the ‘industrious revolution’ but differed from 
it in crucial respects. The novelty of the latter, and of wage and salaried labour 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  C.	  A.	  	  Bayly,	  The	  Birth	  of	  the	  Modern	  World,	  1780-­‐1914:	  Global	  Connections	  and	  Comparisons,	  	  Oxford	  2004,	  
p.	  51-­‐2.,	  	  
13	  	  Bayly,	  The	  Birth	  of	  the	  Modern	  World,	  p.	  6.	  
	  
more generally,  was its embedded, ‘voluntary’ and self-willed character. The 
wage-workers’ household  had horizons and an element of flexibility and self-
control denied to the slave. The willingness of such workers to accept longer 
and more intense hours of labour reflected the ‘dull compulsion’ of economic 
necessity, albeit with penny packets of tobacco or sugar brightening a few 
moments of recreation. Karl Marx insisted that the working class household 
differed from the slave cabin in its access  to a diverse range of  social products, 
notably including newspapers, a cultural item with great political importance.14   
It was physical not economic compulsion which kept the plantation slave at 
work. This statement identifies the critical element in the social relations of 
slavery and does not exclude a more complex account of everyday motivations 
and inherited practices and assumptions. The African captives originally 
purchased by the New World planters had been overwhelmingly young adults 
with experience of agricultural labour and team work. As captives, they knew 
that hard labour would very probably be their lot. But none of this meant that 
slaves accepted enslavement, especially the permanent and rigid slavery, and 
unrelenting toil, that awaited them in the American plantations. Planters and 
overseers were keenly aware that, left to themselves, the slaves would not exert 
themselves for the planters’ benefit but would cultivate foodstuffs on their plots, 
or even purloin a small quantity of the cash crop that they could sell or barter to 
itinerant peddlers or in local markets. Any lapse in vigilance would prompt the 
slaves to neglect the staple, to ‘help themselves’ or escape. The enslaved  were 
obviously not ‘beneficiaries’ of the  globalised networks. Indeed their 
remoteness and invisibility was among the reasons that their miserable fate 
could be ignored or discounted. The slave’s resistance to regimentation and hard 
labour could only be overcome by  the whip, the handsaw (palmatorio)  and the 
stocks, and a whole carceral organisation of plantation society to support it.  
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Punishment and patrols were needed  to ensure and enforce labouring for the 
good of the plantation and its owner. Against this background petty privileges, 
concessions and incentives could also be offered (or withdrawn).   
The psychology and context of forced labour and the slave household was the 
antithesis of Jan de Vries’s ‘industrious revolution’.15 Typically the slaves were 
marched out to the fields around 4.0 am or 5.0  am without the benefit of 
‘breakfast’, eating their first meal of the day a little before noon. Enslaved 
persons showed much ingenuity and effort in supplementing the limited and 
monotonous diet that was supplied to them by their owners, but  the slave 
household did not have anything like the flexibility or market engagement of the 
free European or North American ‘industrious’ household when it came to 
allocating overall labouring time, or  selecting a basket of consumption goods. 
The slave households had few cooking or eating utensils and no sewing 
machines. The first slavery in Saint Domingue and Jamaica had seen extensive 
slave participation  in Sunday markets, but the evidence to be considered in 
chapter 4 suggests that there were fewer markets and that peddlers played only a 
modest role. 
My remarks are directed at the view that the industrious revolution and 
plantation slavery were kindred social phenomena but not at all of the often 
strong link between the two, as the demand for the produce of the slave 
plantations itself tempted more farmers and wage labourers into greater 
involvement in market-related activity, with sweetened coffee and other such 
items being a key element in the package that transformed the desires of 
consumers. Jan de Vries himself stresses the stimulus received from  this 
quarter. 16  He cites the pioneering role of Sidney Mintz in this regard, quoting 
his classic study, Sweetness and Power,  and commenting on it in the following 
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passage: ‘”The first sweetened cup of hot tea to be drunk by an English worker 
was a significant historic event, because it prefigured the transformation of an 
entire society, a total remaking of its economic and social basis...” Mintz..asks 
his reader to believe that all the things that followed from this act (a mass 
change of consumer behaviour, consumerism, slave-based plantation 
economies, colonialism, capitalism) were truly consequences of a fatal inherent 
taste...The approach to consumer tastes I have presented..seeks to contextualize 
and thereby endogenize the process of consumer capital formation.  – to treat 
consumption innovations as flowing from accumulated experience and 
knowledge rather than appearing as an exogenously determined event. 
Nevertheless, Mintz is surely correct to call attention to the far-reaching 
ramifications of consumer clusters.’17  
While I share this last sentiment I believe that the earlier summary of  Mintz’s 
analysis needs to be qualified. Not only does the taste for sweetened tea (or 
coffee) need to be contextualized but the sequence flowing from it nuanced. Tea 
did not have to be produced by slave or colonial labour and for a considerable 
time was produced under very different conditions from the colonial slavery of 
the New World. Furthermore I would also argue that slave plantations were 
more the consequence than the cause of capitalism. Mintz’s vaguer wording is 
to be preferred to de Vries’s crisp summary of consequences. 
Let us consider further links and consumer ‘packages’. These were wider than 
Bayly allows. While  ‘breakfast’ nicely captures the compensation offered to 
some free workers by the industrious revolution, the critical breakthrough to a 
thorough-going  industrial revolution came with cotton fabrics, often dyed with 
indigo. Cotton had played some role in the earlier, pre-industrial phase but it 
became of critical importance with the introduction of power looms and 
associated industrial methods, using water or steam power. This innovation first 
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appeared in the 1760s but took several decades to perfect. Cotton yarn was  
easier to adapt to the industrial process  than wool or flax, and cotton clothing 
was easier to wash. Moths love silk or wool but avoid cotton. With its freshness, 
lightness and smoothness, cotton is nicer to wear next to the skin than wool or 
flax. Cotton was, as de Vries notes,  ‘fashion’s favourite’. The invention of blue 
jeans, and of cotton underwear, was just as momentous as the invention of 
breakfast. (The slaves were issued with homespun cloth and other ‘negro 
clothing’ but not, Walter Johnson observes, underwear, increasing the sexual 
vulnerability of  enslaved women and girls.18) 
Cotton found new markets everywhere, in the colonies as well as metropolis, in 
Africa and Asia as well as Europe. The United States, Brazil and Cuba were 
important markets for British cottons. Though other slave crops had their 
importance the  ultimate triumph of the slave plantations was the avalanche of 
raw cotton they produced, burying all rivals - and all scruples. Here we have the 
clearest evidence of a ‘second slavery’ and its promotion by industrial 
capitalism. The wage workers also themselves constituted a market – the more 
so once they persuaded their employers to pay them in cash not tokens or credit 
at the company store. Details of this fateful nexus will be given below  but 
consider that in 1802 the US produced 55 million lbs of cotton, in 1820 160 mn 
lbs, in 1830 331 million lbs, in 1840 814 mn lbs, in 1850 1.001 mn lbs and in 
1860 lb 2,241 mn lbs.19 About three quarter of this cotton was exported to 
Britain.  
Kenneth Pomeranz estimates that the land required to grow  all the slave-
produce exported by the US to Britain in 1830 would have been somewhere 
between 25 and 30 million acres, an area greater than Britain’s entire arable and 
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pasture land put together.20  North America was no longer a colony of Britain 
but British merchants and manufacturers still disposed of its most valuable 
marketed crop, contributing two thirds of US export earnings.  
The slave systems also boosted demand for metal goods, linking up with 
another dimension of industrialisation. The Atlantic slave trade and the slave 
plantations it supplied created strong demand for every type of metal 
manufacture, whether iron bars and firearms for purchasing slaves in Africa, the 
shackles for use during the ‘middle passage’, or the hoes and machetes for the 
slave gangs to wield in the Americas. The galloping demand for metal acted as 
a forced draught, fanning the flames of industrialisation.  
The work regime of the plantation, kept at full pitch by whip and stocks, was a 
sort of semi-mechanisation, wedded to steam power in processing but relying on 
unaided human effort in cultivation (on which more below). The plantation and 
the factory, the trading vessel and the port city, were establishing new reference 
points for freedom and bondage. Cotton cloth that was the product of slave 
labour in the Americas, and of child labour in the mines and factories of 
Northwest Europe, was fashioned into white shirts, blouses and pants that 
conveyed a sense of the consumer’s respectability, freedom and independence. 
Thus the toil of the slaves and an incipiently global network of exchanges 
supplied the core items of a life style that defined civilised consumption.  
Coffee houses, tea parties, newspapers and advertisements  supplied the 
conveniences and seductions of a way of life that intensified consumers’ 
dependence on distant climes. Whereas black and silver dominated the baroque, 
this new world of consumption was intensely white, the white of refined sugar 
or cotton calicoes, or of white-washed stucco and sun-bleached sail. However 
the hidden and distant world of production  rested on black slave gangs, 
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darkened and airless holds, cramped coal pits and ‘dark satanic mills’ (William 
Blake’s poem ‘America’ shows him to be well aware of New World satanic 
mills too). 
The ominous and oppressive results of accelerating globalization were 
intermingled with potentially more benign consequences as the new exchanges 
spread domesticated plants (potatoes, maize, bananas, rice, peanuts) and 
animals (horses, sheep and cattle) from one part of the world to another. Where 
they found the right soils and conditions – social as well as natural - these new 
products reduced the toil needed to reproduce human life. Depending on 
prevailing  social relations this could boost the autonomy of small-holders or 
intensify landlordism. As we will see the planters actively sought new crop 
varieties and breeds. The enslaved Africans too brought with them an expertise 
in cultivation (of rice and of a number of subsistence crops). The social relations 
of enslavement allowed the slaveowner to benefit from the ingenuity and effort 
of their slaves’ will to survive and skill in cultivation (about which more later).  
Globalisation Sows Conflict and Resistance 
In 1770 the Abbé Raynal published  the first edition of his best-seller L’Histoire 
des Deux Mondes. Its opening words were: ‘Nothing in the history of mankind 
in general, or of Europe in particular, has been as significant as the discovery of 
the New World and the route to India by way of the Cape of Good Hope. These 
events marked the beginning of a revolution in the commerce and power of 
nations, and the way of life, the industry and government of all peoples. It was 
from this moment on that the inhabitants of the most far-flung lands were 
brought closer together by new relationships and new needs.’ 21   
This perceptive salute  marks the ‘revolution in commerce’ and links it to a new 
‘way of life’, ‘new relationships and new needs’.  Implicitly old ways of life, 
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previously sheltered from comparison, were to be swept aside. Was slavery in 
the Americas part of the old world or part of the new?   
The  Histoire des Deux Mondes  was utterly contradictory when it came to 
colonial slavery. The Spanish king was urged to promote slave plantations  in 
his possessions, with tips on how this was to be done and the best management 
of an enslaved work force. The Spanish and Portuguese authorities were invited 
to learn from the supposedly more humane regulation of slavery in the French 
colonies. (A standard trope of imperial myth-making was the claim by each 
imperial power that its own practice of slavery was well-regulated, benign and 
an example to others). On the other hand this book, which was the work of 
several hands, also contained a memorable denunciation of slaveholding, with 
the warning that such an explosive and hateful practice sowed  discord between 
the powers as statesmen belatedly grasped that sugar or cotton plantations were 
now more valuable than silver mines. . Readers were warned that reliance on a 
brutal slave regime would exact a price - the time was not far distant when a 
new Spartacus would arise at the head of a servile insurrection and avenge the 
wrongs done to the sons and daughters of Africa.  
It is generally reckoned that this passage was written by Denis Diderot, helped 
perhaps by Jean de Pechmeja. The Enlightenment had a mixed record when it 
came to addressing colonial slavery but Diderot represented its more radical 
strand with his recognition of a universal human moral agency. Raynal was 
prepared to countenance Diderot’s anti-slavery flourishes in a context where 
they undercut the British claim to be the leading Atlantic power. Raynal 
accepted a secret pension from the French colonial ministry and his vision 
chimed in with a reform of Bourbon institutions that would  propel them to 
victory over the English. This helps to explain the vein of prophecy in the book 
which seems to anticipate the American Revolution, the willingness of the 
	  
French king to back the rebels, the outbreak of the Haitian revolution and 
imperial attempts to claim the ‘moral capital’ of anti-slavery.   
It was still early days for the ‘revolution in commerce’ when the Histoire des 
Deux Mondes was first published. The great systems of colonial monopoly were 
all still in place, but widespread contraband and rival projects of ‘reform’ were 
already loosening the constraints. The plantation trades boosted the wealth and 
aspirations of the planters and led them to buy more provisions from local, or at 
least American, farmers and merchants. Incremental doses of ‘free trade’, 
opened a breach wherever more competition was allowed, and the more 
dynamic mercantile faction prospered whenever tariffs were lowered and 
mercantilist privileges removed. 
The American rebels challenged the British claim to tax and regulate its 
colonies. North American merchants, planters and farmers wished to do 
business with whomever they wished, and to manage their own affairs, demands 
incompatible with imperial authority. The French royal authorities were so 
desperate to have their revenge on the British that they were willing to overlook 
this danger and join forces with the American rebels. Wartime conditions 
further encouraged contraband while the Spanish and Portuguese authorities 
believed they had to modernise and relax commercial restrictions.  
In this way ‘free trade’ favoured trade with the plantation zone and hence 
boosted slavery. No less certainly the exchanges with the plantations fostered 
the migration and reproduction of capital in ways that assisted industrialisation. 
But ‘free trade’ was also part of an anti-colonial struggle, a struggle against 
tyranny and imperial privilege. The eighteenth century plantation boom had 
stimulated a ‘picaresque proletariat’ of artisans and wage labourers, printers and 
market gardeners, seamen and dockers, migrants and adventurers. These social 
layers swelled the ranks of the patriots and liberty boys, demanding political 
	  
freedom and social equality, an end to censorship, manhood suffrage and access 
to livelihood. 
The Belated Birth of Abolitionism    
Colonial  slavery first flourished at a time when slavery was an almost 
unchallenged institution in the civilised centres of power. By contrast the 
‘second slavery’ was defined by the fact that it survived the great wave of anti-
slavery – slave revolt and  abolitionism – that targeted the slave trade and which 
destroyed or suppressed slavery in the French and British colonies.  The lands 
of the ‘second slavery’ were deeply marked by the fate they escaped.  
The idea of abolition or universal freedom was a new one. Slavery had withered 
and even expired in several parts of late medieval Europe but without any 
general legislation suppressing  it and without any philosopher or theologian 
condemning it. African enslavement had provoked resistance at every step but 
not in the name of universal liberation. There had been slave revolts, and private 
challenges to slaveholding, and wars of resistance by the indigenous peoples, 
from the earliest days of colonization. In the 18th century  it was not the famous 
philosophers of the ‘Enlightenment’, or preachers of the ‘Great Awakening’ 
who led the way but anonymous groups of ordinary colonists like those 
responsible for the Germantown resolution of 1688 or the Georgia petition of 
1739. Likewise the first steps towards the rejection of slavery were ‘freedom 
suites’, legal cases taken to claim that particular victims were wrongfully held 
in slavery. In French as well as English courts such freedom suites might simply 
contest the details of a given transaction, and this would not challenge the 
legitimacy of slavery as such. But on a number of occasions – such as the 
famous Mansfield decision of 1772 freeing Somersett – the case was argued in 
more fundamental terms, namely that Somersett was free because there was no 
positive support for enslavement in English law. These freedom suites, whether 
	  
in France or Britain, could only be sustained by tenacious and courageous 
groups of friends, supporters and relations, and they naturally reflected in some 
way the great quarrels of the time. The  Mansfield decision itself may be seen as 
a metropolitan warning to the turbulent North Americans. Whatever the motive, 
this was one of scores of such judgments which closed particular jurisdictions to 
slaveholding, gradually marking off ‘free’ and ‘slave’ territory.  
 
Eventually these disparate sources of opposition were succeeded by  a 
fundamental and public critique aiming at radical abolition and universal 
liberation, dating to the 1760s. The Quaker pioneers  Benjamin Lay and 
Anthony Benezet made the crucial step from private critique to public agitation 
at this time,  having largely won the argument within the Society of Friends. At 
a time of rising patriotism and hostilities, Quakers found a cause which 
reinforced and justified their pacifism. The Seven Years War was a hugely 
destructive and costly orgy of aggrandisement and conquest. It was to provoke  
an imperial crisis amongst all protagonists. While the British had to cope with 
too much success, the other powers were licking their wounds and planning for 
recovery and revenge. 
The French and Spanish royal authorities were worried that their colonists were 
in league with English smugglers, neglectful of the national interest  and deaf to 
royal commands. The planters of Saint Domingue were happy to buy supplies 
from the English colonists and to sell them molasses and other plantation 
products in return. For their part the Spanish authorities had been shocked by 
the welcome accorded to the English invaders when they seized Havana in 
1762. Imperial reformers aimed to reorganize trade restrictions, removing the 
monopolies enjoyed by Seville and Bordeaux but retaining preferences for 
national carriers. And as a counterweight to the white creoles the French 
	  
authorities promoted a coloured militia, a measure that aroused a howl of 
protest from the colonial whites in the French islands and particularly in Saint 
Domingue. (The Spanish and Portuguese colonial authorities had already 
shown, as mentioned above,  that, in difficult times, a coloured militia could 
furnish an additional prop of loyal support.) 
The first thorough and radical attack on slavery by a jurist or philosopher was a 
chapter of George Wallace’s A System  of the Principles of the Law of Scotland  
in 1760. This uncompromising indictment,  with its call for immediate 
emancipation, appeared as an extract in a much-reprinted compilation on the 
wrongs of slavery and the slave trade published by Anthony Benezet in 1762. 
Wallace’s call for the immediate freeing of all slaves was also echoed at length 
in an entry on Atlantic slavery and slave trading in the French Encyclopédie 
(1765). Prior to the appearance of Wallace’s chapter the only secular, 
philosophical critique of racial slavery was a satirical passage in Montesquieu’s 
Esprit des Lois in 1748. While the latter should be given credit for ridiculing 
racist defences of slavery it was by no means a systematic rejection of 
slaveholding.  The rise of Atlantic commerce stimulated the self-confidence of 
those associated with it and created a vibrant ‘civil society’. The Seven Years 
War led to the end of French rule in North America, removing a powerful 
constraint on the English colonists. The Americans, as they now called 
themselves, were no longer so dependent on Britain nor so willing to submit to 
metropolitan claims and regulations.  The subsequent  controversies over  
colonial rights and metropolitan prerogatives involved an extraordinary 
outpouring of thousands of pamphlets, journals, lampoons and newspapers, 
devoted to such secular topics as taxation, property, representation and the 
proper scope of freedom. Only a tiny number of these writings  mentioned the 
rights and wrongs of slavery, though the American rebels often lamented their 
own supposed enslavement to the mother country.  Nevertheless there was 
	  
something odd about slavery and it became a source of controversy. Once this 
happened the opening lines of the Declaration of Independence lent themselves 
to challenges to slaveholding.  
At the outset of the struggle  one of the British commanders, Lord Dunmore the 
governor of  Virginia,  offered freedom to slaves willing to dessert  rebel 
owners and enrol in the British forces. Enough responded to allow Dunmore to 
form an ‘Ethiopian regiment’. As the conflict unfolded a number of British 
commanders welcomed slaves deserting rebel owners, engaging them as 
servants or support workers. A few thousand free blacks or former slaves fought 
in the rebel ranks, sometimes serving as substitutes for their owners. However 
the slave-owners of the plantation zone did not permit the enrolment of black 
soldiers in Southern military units. At a difficult moment for the rebellion John 
Laurence, son of the financier Henry Laurence, urged the creation of a black 
battalion but the South Carolina assembly vetoed the plan.  The American 
rebels adopted a ban on slave imports in its general commercial boycott.  
Both sides, with their massive stake in plantations, shied away from any general 
anti-slavery stance.  However the strains of war did provoke an abolitionist 
response in some quarters. The run up to the Independence war had witnessed 
class struggles between the richer merchants and proprietors, on the one side, 
and the mass of poorer and middling citizens, on the other. These clashes 
diminished respect for property in ways that made emancipation easier to 
countenance. In 1777 the radical ‘Green Mountain men’ broke away from New 
York and set up the new state of Vermont, adopting a constitution which 
outlawed both slavery and indentured labour. In Philadelphia the radicals, with 
their attacks on the greed of the ‘forestalling’ merchants,  had influence with the 
militia and assembly. While poorer citizens starved, the merchants kept their 
warehouses locked and waited for prices to rise even further. In some cases 
merchants were believed to have sold grain to the French or even the English. 
	  
Gary Nash describes how the setting up of a Committee on Trade to regulate 
prices and sales created a situation where ‘advocates of an unrestricted market 
economy and supporters of a managed moral economy stared and shouted at 
one another over a widening chasm’.22   
In 1780 the assembly of Pennsylvania adopted a moderate emancipation law, 
which freed the children born to slave mothers once they reached the age of 28. 
Pennsylvania was a state at war, wracked by social strife, shortages and 
inflation. The preamble to the emancipation law pointed out that there were few 
slaves left in the state (many left with the British) and the law itself did not free 
any of them. This moderate measure was reached after public debate and with 
serious concessions to the slaveholders (eg the raising of the age of freedom).  
The freedmen it created would have the same rights as anyone else. The 
assembly which passed this law was amongst the most radical  in 
Pennsylvania’s history but its support for the ‘free womb’ measure should 
probably be seen as offering a new basis of collaboration between rich and poor, 
patriots and pacifists. It was a measure which any North American rebel could 
take pride in and could be cited as proof  that free trade did not have to mean the 
spread of slavery. It fostered the misleading idea that slavery was on the way 
out in North America. 
While other Northern states eventually adopted measures to phase out slavery, 
the assemblies of the Southern states, with their massive slave populations, did 
not even consider free womb laws. In the immediate afterglow of Revolution  
private manumissions were (for a time) made easier in Virginia and many 
thousands were freed in recognition of their loyal service.  The ban on the slave 
trade maintained by all states except South Carolina. The leaders of the new 
republic might be embarrassed by the presence of half a million slaves still in 
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bondage but they nevertheless regarded them as an asset and resource of the 
greatest importance. 
Abolitionism emerged as a mass movement in the defeated metropolis, not 
amongst the victorious former colonists. Britain’s defeat in North America 
precipitated a profound legitimacy crisis. It challenged the Hanoverian order, 
with its corrupt and unrepresentative ruling institutions, and its newly assertive 
middle classes and artisans. After all, the rebels had been fighting for ‘English 
liberties’ and their victory had exposed the oligarchy’s incompetence, arrogance 
and venality. Britain’s cautious reform movement did not feel strong enough to 
challenge the oligarchy head-on, especially at a time of wounded national pride. 
The public campaign against the slave trade which erupted in the years 1787 to 
1792 gave the advocates of reform  an issue which dramatised the need for 
change at the heart of the monarchy and empire. Leading figures in the 
universities, the Anglican Church, the Admiralty, and eventually parliament 
itself, rallied to the cause, with the Quakers, prodded by young American 
Friends,  playing a crucial organizational role.23 The Society for the Abolition of 
the Atlantic Slave trade attracted highly respectable support while organising a 
nation-wide campaign of petitions and public meetings. The new provincial 
press rallied to the cause, as did the Nonconformist Protestant denominations, 
especially the Methodists. The parliamentary champions of slave trade abolition 
were to include William Pitt, the prime minister and his friend William 
Wilberforce, both men still in their twenties. Legislation was blocked in the 
powerful House of Lords but this only encouraged the abolitionists to step up 
their agitation outside parliament. That something new was afoot was suggested 
by the founding of an abolitionist society in France, the Amis des Noirs, and by 
the decision of the Danish government to anticipate  British action by winding 
down its own role in the Atlantic traffic.    
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The British ‘abolitionist’ campaign of 1787-92 was formally limited to ending 
the Atlantic slave trade but its supporters often claimed or implied that, cut off 
from new supplies, the slaveholders of the British West Indies would be 
induced to improve conditions on the plantations and eventually end slavery 
itself. The North American rebels had adopted slave trade bans as a war 
measure and rebuke to the British, but without a more general anti-slavery 
rationale. The slave population of the North American plantation zone already 
reproduced itself without the need for new imports. The expansive planters of 
South Carolina still wished for access to new supplies and some Northern 
merchants were quite prepared to oblige them. But most Virginian planters saw 
no hardship in a slave trade ban and understood that reopening the traffic would 
deprive the republic of the moral high ground and expose it to scorn. 
The Triumphs of Abolition 
The first decade of the 19th century witnessed advances for abolition that have 
been hailed as the onset of a ‘humanitarian revolution’. Between 1807 and 1825  
the governments of all the Atlantic states solemnly denounced the Atlantic slave 
and many prominent voices were raised against slavery itself. Philosophers and 
economists lambasted the folly of reliance on slave labour. Abolitionism was 
embraced by some unlikely recruits to philanthropy. Napoleon issued a decree 
against the slave trade during his 100 days, the Duke of Wellington and Lord 
Castlereagh labored hard to promote abolitionist diplomacy, Tsar Alexander 
declared  himself a convert to the cause, and Andrew Jackson, the victor of the 
Battle of New Orleans, enrolled as a founding member of the American 
Colonization Society in 1816, a body dedicated to facilitating the manumission 
and resettlement of slaves. The legitimist monarch of France, Charles X, 
recognized the republic of Haiti in 1825 but obliged the Haitian government to 
pay a heavy indemnity to compensate French planters for the loss of their estates. . 
The Haitians gained greater security and Haitian coffee producers gained access to 
	  
the French market. The survival of Haiti as a black state based on the suppression 
of slavery helped to push William Wilberforce and Simon Bolivar to more radical 
anti-slavery positions and served as a monumental warning to the slaveholders of 
the Americas.   
Only in retrospect did the historic uprising of the slaves in Saint Domingue in 
August 1791 carry an abolitionist message. At the time and for years to come fear 
of the slaves’ bloody vengeance overwhelmed any other sentiment and merged 
with the Anti-Jacobin panic. The Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) must be 
accounted a foundational event for the ‘second slavery’ and merits a brief 
description. The original revolt embraced at least 30,000 rebels in the colony’s 
Northern plain, some of whom escaped to the surrounding hills; there were also 
outbreaks in other parts of the colony. Divisions between royalists and 
republicans, between those who defended the ‘aristocracy of the skin’ and those 
attacked it, gave the rebels their chance.   
The French Jacobins at first strove to suppress the slave rebellion but, having 
failed to do so, were belatedly persuaded to embrace the cause of black freedom. 
In February 1794 the National  Convention decreed the end of slavery in the 
French colonies. The black general Toussaint Louverture, who had been fighting 
for the Spanish king, rallied to the French republic. The ‘black Jacobins’ 
successively defeated attempts to restore slavery in Saint Domingue  by Spain 
(1792-5) , Britain (1794-8) and Napoleon’s France (1802-3). At the close of this 
extraordinary saga the new state of Haiti was established in 1804, with a 
constitution which outlawed slavery and proclaimed Haiti a refuge for any slave, 
or any indigenous person, seeking freedom. iaHaiti was presented as an ally 
against Napoleon while the virtual elimination of French colonial produce made it 
easier for the British parliament to deprive their own West Indian planters of the 
possibility of buying new slave supplies. The naval victory at Trafalgar in`1805 
confirmed Britain’s maritime supremacy and ruled out a French invasion but did 
	  
nothing to reduce Britain’s isolation in Europe.  At a difficult moment, with 
Bonaparte apparently triumphant, and Britain friendless in Europe, and on 
worsening terms with the United Sates,  the British  parliament rallied the nation 
by enacting the Atlantic slave trade ban in 1807, twenty years after the founding 
of the abolitionist Society. The United States adopted a similar measure in 1808. 
At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the European great powers solemnly 
repudiated the transatlantic slave traffic. Implementation was another matter, as 
we will see, but the consensus achieved by the ‘international community’, was 
superficially impressive. 
These dramatic gains for abolitionism were a worry for even the most hard-boiled  
slaveholders and merchants. Yet they were also aware of  the huge opportunities 
opened up by the collapse of plantation agriculture in Saint Domingue, the largest 
colonial producer of sugar, coffee and cotton in 1790. Prices shot through the roof 
in the next decade or so. The challenge for the most advantageously situated of the 
large slave-owners of the New World was to avoid the fate of the French slave-
owners and to satisfy the pent-up demand for plantation produce in Europe and 
North America. It turned out that the US South, Cuba and Brazil were best placed 
for , and most capable of, reinventing New World slavery in a largely post-
mercantilist and post-colonial era. But this required defiance of  the anti-slavery 
consensus and taking issue with the central place of abolitionism in the 
‘humanitarian revolution’.  The ideological obstacles to a ‘second slavery’ did not 
have to be tackled all at once. Colonialism and mercantilism could be evaded and 
dismantled piecemeal as individual merchants and planters responded to new 
opportunities. But eventually vast new tracts of land needed to be made safe for 
slaveholding. The ‘second slavery’ had to become a slaveholding wedge securely 
inscribed within the wider Atlantic capitalism. This required new constructions of 
race and civilization and a primitive accumulation of the social power needed to 
prevail.The fragility of the slave order required sharp attention to the scope of 
	  
sovereignty and the rise of anti-slavery threatened the slaveholders’ honour as 
well as their pocket book. 
 
Planters were very powerful and prominent in the lands of the ‘second slavery’ 
but they needed social allies and political connections, both within the slave zone 
and outside it. The Constitution of the United States, the colonial government of 
Cuba and the Empire of Brazil integrated the slave regimes into a larger structure 
of representation and power. In each case power was fractured so that the colony 
of Cuba was subject to special laws, and that the states of Brazil and the US South 
had a significant, if never fully established or specified, margin of autonomy and 
sphere of  ‘states rights’.  
 
